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 Numerous research works indicate that the cycle of boom and crisis 
can be regarded as a natural element in financial market history. On the other 
hand, there is a rich discussion among practitioners and academics on the 
origins of the recent global economic and financial crisis, which led the 
world into the deepest and most severe downturn since the Great Depression 
in the 1930s. An explanation solely based on the collapse of the U.S. housing 
bubble and its effects seems far too short-sighted. In addition to economic 
elucidations and rationalizations, there are also behavioral and socio-
economic explanations, which take into account the powerful social and 
psychological forces at work in financial markets. This article approaches the 
discussion from a mass psychological perspective. Starting from the 
shortcomings of mainstream economic approaches in predicting market 
trends and their underlying trading behavior realistically, the paper elucidates 
postulated mechanisms behind mass phenomena and provides a concise 
review of literature on collective dynamics in financial markets. We then 
delineate previous research on the distinction between mass phenomena and 
attempt to transfer this theoretical framework to financial markets. 
Consequently the final section discusses directions for future research to 
extend the foundations of the theoretical frame of reference. 
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1. Introduction 
 A total of over forty-five different major crises in various regions of 
the world, which resulted from preceding euphoric and speculative booms in 
some market activity and which spread either locally or internationally, have 
struck the markets since the beginning of the seventeenth century 
(Kindleberger, 1978/2005; Galbraith, 1994). Historical examples include the 
Dutch Tulip Bulb mania in 1636 and 1637, the Mississippi / South Sea 
bubble, which peaked in 1720, the late 1920ies stock market mania or the 
New Economy bubble from 1995 to 2000. The review of financial market 
history indicates that recurrent episodes of speculative booms and their 
reversals in the form of crashes and panics can be regarded as a natural 
element in financial market history. 
 Compared to the crises and recessions observed in the past decades, 
such as the banking and loan crisis of the 1980ies, the Asian crisis in the 
1990ies or the collapse of the Dot.com bubble in March 2000, the recent 
crisis reflects the deepest and most severe financial and economic crisis since 
the Great Depression in the 1930s. Hence, there is an extensive discussion 
among practitioners and academics on the origins of the recent global crisis. 
In addition to economic elucidations and rationalizations, there are 
behavioral and socio-economic explanations, which take into account the 
powerful social and psychological forces at work in financial markets. For 
example, Shiller (2008) draws the attention to the process of social contagion 
and Deutschmann (2008) views the recent financial crisis in light of long-
term structural socio-economic changes in advanced industrial societies.  
 This article approaches the discussion from a mass psychological 
perspective. Starting from the shortcomings of mainstream economic 
approaches in predicting market trends and their underlying trading behavior 
realistically, section 2 of our paper elucidates postulated mechanisms behind 
mass phenomena and provides a concise review of literature on collective 
dynamics in financial markets. We then delineate previous research on the 
distinction between mass phenomena in section 3 and attempt to transfer this 
theoretical framework to financial markets in section 4. This part of the 
paper specifically addresses the question, whether the events related to the 
recent global crisis can be characterized applying the concept of first and 
second order mass phenomena (Fenzl, 2009; Malik, 2010). Importantly, the 
presented framework is intended to serve as a starting point for upcoming 
work in this area. Consequently the final section discusses directions for 
future research to extend the foundations of the theoretical frame of 
reference. 
2. Theoretical background and state of the art: 
2.1 Failure of traditional economic and financial models 
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 The mainstream economic approach in asset pricing, which crucially 
depends on utility maximization and rational expectations of a so-called 
“homo oeconomicus”, can neither explain why asset price bubbles and 
overreactions in short-term market price movements arise in first place, nor 
rule them out in general (Stracca, 2004). Populated with rational market 
participants an economic market does remarkably well in coordinating and 
integrating the efforts of millions of self-serving individuals. However, 
numerous research works in Behavioral Finance have provided convincing 
evidence that financial market prices spend far more time deviating from the 
theoretical equilibrium postulated by the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) 
than actually tending towards it (Thaler, 1992; Shefrin, 2000; Shleifer, 2000; 
Prechter and Parker, 2007). Nonetheless the EMH has remained the 
prevailing paradigm in financial markets for many decades and some 
representatives of the standard economic approach to financial markets plea 
for sticking to market efficiency. They argue that abnormal returns are 
chance events, that overreaction to information is about as common as 
underreaction, and that apparent anomalies, which are reported with 
statistical significance, are most likely no more than methodological errors 
and disappear with reasonable changes in technique (Fama, 1998). 
 On the other hand, Shiller (Shiller, 1984; 1990; 2000; 2008), Shleifer 
(2000), Prechter and Parker (2007) and others present several reasons why 
traditional economic and financial theories often fail to explain and predict 
financial market trends and their underlying trading behavior realistically. 
The two predominant aspects are that the mainstream approaches do neither 
pay enough attention to psychological aspects of human behavior, such as 
systematic cognitive biases in the intuitive judgment of financial risks 
(Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982; DeBondt and Thaler, 2002; Gilovich, 
Griffin and Kahneman, 2002), nor to social issues.  
2.2 Social influence: the impact of others 
 The second aspect, which our work focuses on, includes the fact that 
market participants are socially embedded in an environment, which 
influences their decisions, behaviors and preferences; vice versa this 
environment is also affected by their actions and choices. Individuals do not 
just interact with their environment, which includes other individuals, groups 
of individuals, the collectivity and other entities, but their interactions have 
consequences for the choices they, and others, make. As a result of these 
interactions people adjust their behavior to the behavior of friends, peers, 
family and other acquaintances in their social environment, or even to 
models provided by the mass media (Cynamon and Fazzari, 2008). This is 
particularly true when environmental complexity is overwhelming and when 
individuals have little or no experience and information. Even in everyday 
life we often choose cars, fashion, stores and restaurants depending on how 
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popular they seem to be among others around us. Hence, what we often 
observe in economic behavior is not necessarily utility-maximization or 
rational choice on the micro-level, but behavior that depends on what others 
are doing or on how others are expected to behave and decide. 
 
Figure 1: 3-year-chart for West Texas Intermediate Crude Oil 
(Source: OnVista Media GmbH http://rohstoffe.onvista.de, 17th January 2009, 
Data: Interactive Data Managed Solutions AG) 
 Already Keynes (1936) suggested in his metaphor of the market as 
"beauty contest" that traders often behave in the very same way in asset 
markets. Most notably Shiller (1984) pointed out that market speculation is a 
social activity, as investors spend a substantial part of their leisure time 
discussing investments, reading about investments or gossiping about others’ 
successes or failures in investing. Consequently it’s often not facts and 
fundamentals, which drive market prices, but rumors, speculations and 
people’s expectations on future trends. This fact can best be illustrated with 
the considerable price movements of crude oil after the collapse of the U.S. 
housing bubble in July 2007: The market price for West Texas Intermediate 
Crude Oil (WTI) reached a new record high of over US$ 140 in summer 
2008 on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) before the price 
tumbled within a short period of time to new bottom territories (see figure 1). 
Fundamental data on crude oil consumption, supply, production and deposits 
did not sacrifice such irrational price movements in either direction. 
 Hence it is a fallacy to argue that “financial” markets are efficient and 
that trading behavior of people is rational all the time and under all 
circumstances. Instead market prices are often driven away from 
fundamental values at least for some time (Prechter and Parker, 2007). 
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Particularly when a market gets crowded with traders and investors, whose 
focus is not on what an asset will produce but what the next market 
participant will pay for it, an asset becomes worth whatever you can sell it 
for.  
2.3 Micromotives and macrobehavior 
 Moreover one has to consider that individuals may belong to a 
collective, which they possibly do not understand and sometimes do not even 
notice at all; comparable to a community of ants, which builds an 
architecturally impressive anthill in the collective although not a single 
individual ant intends that. In a similar way humans often show collective 
behaviors which exceed the horizon of an individual. In particular, individual 
incentives and the micromotives of millions of people, who exert social 
influence on each other through interactions in the environment, may lead to 
collective results that the individuals neither intend nor need to be aware of. 
For example a bank run, in which people believe that a bank is on the verge 
of insolvency and hurry to withdraw their deposits, may cause a bank failure, 
although there is no universal desire for the bankruptcy of the bank.  
 The aggregation of this type of behavior often entails dynamics that 
cause exuberant rise or fall in market prices. What goes on in the hearts and 
thoughts of millions of traders and investors, who participate in financial 
markets, often has little to do with the massive results that they can generate. 
Financial market panics, where securities and other assets are being sold on a 
massive scale, are such an example. Behavior which appears rational for the 
individual creates danger to the entire community, as attempts made by 
individuals to save themselves contribute to everyone’s downfall. Such 
situations, in which individual choices and actions depend on the choices of 
other people, don’t permit any simple summation or extrapolation to the 
aggregates. This is an often little-understood point not only in financial 
markets but also in many other settings where social dynamics emerge. In 
particular financial market booms and crises are aggregate results that often 
have no recognizable counterpart at the level of the individual, making them 
hard to unveil at an early stage. In order to make the connection between 
micromotives and macrobehavior in such situations one has to study the 
system of interactions between individuals and their environment, which 
includes the interactions between individuals and other individuals as well as 
between individuals and the collectivity (Schelling, 1978/2006). 
Consequently the macrobehavior associated with recurrent patterns of asset 
prize bubbles and crashes has micro-foundations, which among others 
involve heterogeneous propensities to herd as well as interdependency of 
speculative behavior on the individual level. 
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2.4 Herding behavior 
 In the attempt to explain the phenomena of synchronized exuberant 
rise and fall in financial market prices and the underlying behavioral patterns 
of traders and investors, the concept of herding has been established in 
Behavioral Finance over the past decades. The essence of herding is that 
unconscious herding impulses sensed by market participants in situations of 
uncertainty, which are reinforced by strong affective feelings produced in the 
limbic system and which have evolutionary origins, lead to mass 
psychological dynamics in the patterns of human aggregate behavior, which 
produce non-mean-reverting dynamism in financial markets (Prechter and 
Parker, 2007). The disagreement of mainstream economists on whether 
empirical research has failed to provide convincing evidence of herding in 
financial markets can be contrasted with the works of Scharfstein and Stein 
(1990), Trueman (1994) and Welch (2000). More recent evidence for the 
theory of herding is provided by the works of Prechter and Parker (2007), 
Sias (2004) or Blasco and Ferreruela (2008). And Menkhoff and Nikiforow 
(2009) even found in their investigations that herding is by far the strongest 
behavioral finance effect perceived by professional fund managers, 
regardless of whether they are endorsers or non-endorsers of Behavioral 
Finance. 
 However, aggregate outcomes in the social sciences (e.g. product 
hypes, mass hysteria, riot or revolt, etc.) involve not merely a sufficient 
number of market participants following a herding impulse. In particular 
they often entail complex social dynamics, which are among others based on 
the propensities for emulation and other-directedness in human behavior, and 
which imply contagion processes. The research on Mass Psychology (Le 
Bon, 1895/1982; Canetti, 1962/1984; Pelzmann, 2002), an important sub 
discipline of Social Psychology, accounts for this fact, that is, individuals 
exert social influence on each other through interactions in the environment. 
Moreover Mass Psychology considers that people may belong to a collective, 
which they possibly do not understand and perhaps do not notice at all. 
Hence the concepts of Mass Psychology can play an important part in the 
description of the emergence and of the dynamics of asset price bubbles and 
financial market crashes. Several postulated mechanisms behind, and 
specific characteristics of, mass phenomena are briefly outlined in the 
following two subsections.  
2.5 Other-directedness and emulation 
 People have a strong tendency to behave other-directed and to 
emulate other people’s behavior, meaning that they use other people’s 
behavior to align themselves and to evaluate what is correct or prudent in a 
particular situation, where the best course of action is unknown. This 
proposition, which implies that contemporaries and peers are an important 
European Scientific Journal   September 2013  edition vol.9, No.25  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
409 
source of direction for the individual, has a solid backing in social 
psychological theory and research, ranging from conformity experiments 
(Asch, 1951) and the concept of other-directedness (Riesman, 1961/2001) to 
the social comparison theory (Veblen, 1899/2002).  
 Especially in the financial market setting, where risk and uncertainty 
are pervasive and cause increased emotional arousal, many traders and 
investors tend to become other-directed and act on or react to other people’s 
behavior while facts and fundamental data become negligible and irrelevant. 
They often act along the lines: everybody else can’t be wrong. The 
application of this behavioral rule is not irrational but “ecologically rational” 
to the degree that people are using the structure of information provided by 
their environment (Pelzmann, 2005). As a consequence genuine individual 
decision-making processes on investment and trading are often displaced by 
responses to other market participants’ behavior. Thus people’s behavior and 
actions relate directly to other people’s choices, dependent on perceived risk. 
The higher the uncertainty and the greater the arousal in a situation, the more 
market participant’s choices, actions and reactions depend on the behavior of 
other traders and investors. Shiller (1990), for example, found in his 
investigation of the crash on Black Monday in October 1987 that in absence 
of any relevant news and under the influence of increased emotional arousal 
traders simply overreacted to each other, trying to figure out what the others 
are doing or what they are likely to do. Even professional money and 
portfolio managers, financial analysts and institutional investors may follow 
others in such an environment and select stocks that others select to avoid 
falling behind and looking bad (Trueman, 1994; Shleifer, 2000; Welch, 
2000; Sias, 2004; Menkhoff and Nikiforow, 2009).  
 However, according to Schelling (1978/2006) we have to be aware of 
the fact that it is not necessarily constraints of conformity that account for 
assimilation and adaption to other peoples’ behavior. It often simply is the 
observed result or outcome of the application of a certain behavior by others, 
their triumph or their failure, which makes people decide one way or the 
other (Fenzl and Brudermann, 2009). Moreover, the propensity for emulation 
is – with the exception of the instinct of self-preservation – probably the 
strongest, most alert and persistent motive in economic behavior (Veblen, 
1899/2002). Among others this tendency in human behavior is caused by 
people’s concerns about their social status, which is a signal of non-
observable abilities. Keynes (1936) grasped this aspect as a rational motive 
for herd behavior, when he mentioned that worldly wisdom teaches that it is 
better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally. 
For example emulation leads to a trend in consumer behavior towards 
conspicuous consumption, since the consumption of more excellent goods 
serves as a signal of wealth. Similarly emulation is one of the driving forces 
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behind mass psychological dynamics in financial market behavior. This 
suggestion is supported by the fact that money derives its origins not only 
from the search for a means of exchange but also from people’s aspiration 
towards reputation and prestige (Schmoelders, 1996). Hence perceived 
success or failure in investing, which results from capital gains and losses, 
becomes an essential signal among market participants, as traders habitually 
gossip about others’ trading successes or failures.  
2.6 Social contagion 
 Social influence on, and contagiousness of, behavior and behavioral 
attitudes play an important issue in the formation of aggregate outcomes in 
the social sciences; they are central to mass phenomena (Schelling, 
1978/2006; Shiller, 1984; Pelzmann, 2002; Dodds and Watts, 2004; 
Salganik, Dodds and Watts, 2006; Salganik and Watts, 2008; Brudermann 
and Fenzl, 2010). Contagion processes can be found in very diverse 
phenomena, such as the diffusion of innovations (Bass, 1969; Rogers, 2003), 
the spread of fads and rumors (Banarjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer 
and Welch, 1998; Kelly and O’Grada, 2005), the outbreak of political or 
social unrest (Granovetter, 1978), and many others. Latest findings in the 
research on societal trends and behavioral traits suggest that contagion 
processes even appear to be relevant in health and health care (Fowler and 
Christakis, 2008; Smith and Christakis, 2008).  
 Social contagion is the transmission of social or psychological 
influence in direct or indirect contacts between individuals and their 
environment. The essence of a social contagion process is that susceptible 
individuals are influenced by the preferences, behavioral attitudes or the 
behavior of other people in single or multiple social interactions; as a result 
they adopt a certain behavioral pattern or refrain from doing so, depending in 
part or in whole on the previous or expected choices and actions of others.  
 Behavioral Finance has identified contagion as one of the underlying 
mechanisms of booms and panics in financial markets, where contagious 
entities such as rumors, profit expectations, trading rules and others are 
transmitted via social interactions. Shiller (1984, 2000, 2008) eminently 
emphasizes the impact of social contagion processes on the synchronization 
of trading behavior. Contagion is of particular importance from the mass 
psychological perspective, since it is not restricted to cognitive processes but 
may also include emotional contagion. In this process individuals and groups 
of individuals influence each others’ emotions or behavior in social 
interactions through the conscious or unconscious induction of behavioral 
attitudes and emotion states (Barsade, 2002). Hence the concept of contagion 
can provide an explanation for the rapid diffusion of euphoria and fear 
among individuals in the financial market setting, where pervasive 
uncertainty leads to increased emotional arousal, and where other-directed 
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market participants continuously monitor the behavior and consequences of 
actions of others in the environment. 
3. Theoretical framework: first and second order mass phenomena 
 Our contribution to a socio-economic understanding of the recent 
global economic and financial crisis originates from previous research on the 
distinction between mass phenomena. In particular we present an existing 
concept in mass psychology in this section, which we will apply to financial 
markets later in the paper. 
 Already in the early beginnings of the investigations of mass 
movements and crowds Le Bon (1895/1982) recognized the distinct meaning 
and differing impact of visible and invisible mass phenomena. He found that 
the remarkable historic events are visible and recognized impacts of invisible 
and unrecognized shifts in human thinking, which take place over the long 
haul. For instance the biggest historic shocks, which led the way to cultural 
transformations, seem to be determined by revolt, destruction, invasion and 
others. The French revolution at the end of the 18th century is such a pattern. 
A proper investigation of these remarkable historic events however reveals 
gradual but substantial changes in people’s ideas and thinking as their true 
causes. In the case of the French revolution these changes are reflected by a 
new set of ideas and values originating from Enlightenment, which already 
peaked in the mid 18th century. Nonetheless it took almost another half 
century until apparent revolt and unrest emerged as a visible consequence. 
 Based on the studies of Le Bon and on the analysis and investigation 
of numerous mass phenomena in the social, political and economic context, a 
distinction between subtle, unrecognized first order mass dynamics and their 
visible and recognized outbreaks in the form of second order mass 
phenomena can be drawn (Fenzl, 2009; Malik, 2010). First order phenomena 
continuously shape and influence human thinking and social mood trends 
and thus determine the character of social actions manifested as economic, 
political, or cultural events. Second order mass movements, which compared 
to first order phenomena only last for a rather short period of time but 
usually produce an intense and visible effect, include phenomena such as 
political revolution, revolt, mass hysteria, and others.  
 To give an overview of the concept of first and second order 
phenomena, we developed following conceptual scheme (see figure 2): 
European Scientific Journal   September 2013  edition vol.9, No.25  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
412 
 
Figure 2: The concept of first and second order phenomena 
 
 The postulated mechanisms underlying second order phenomena 
include other-directed behavior, emulation and imitation, synchronization of 
individuals and co-movement (Fenzl, 2009; Malik 2010). They have been 
discussed in the previous section.55 First order phenomena partly entail the 
same mechanisms, but they also involve several other mechanisms and 
properties, which are non-existent in second order phenomena: 
• Long time horizon: Changes in social mood or human thinking due to the 
dynamics of first order mass phenomena typically evolve slowly over a 
long period of time. By contrast the intense and visible effect produced 
by second order mass phenomena takes place within a comparatively 
short timeframe. 
• No pre-defined goal or direction: While the primary focus of interest in a 
second order phenomenon usually is a well-defined goal, a distinct 
activity or the pursuit of a predefined direction (e.g. selling shares 
immediately, escaping the fire, overthrow of the dictator, deportation of 
the Jews, etc.), the common striving in a first order phenomenon is based 
on a particular shared mood and/or a gentle, slight and abstract idea 
(Malik, 2010). 
• Subtle change in social mood, missing awareness: First order phenomena 
generally involve a shift in social mood or human thinking, which most 
people are usually not consciously aware of (Fenzl, 2009). A better 
                                                          
55 For the further purpose of this paper we already discussed these mechanisms with respect 
to the financial market setting in the previous section. 
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understanding of the missing awareness for first order phenomena can be 
attained by considering following example: A frog is placed into a bowl 
of water with room temperature. When the water is heated up 
considerably all of a sudden, the frog will instantly jump out of the bowl, 
as he perceives the imminent danger. If the water however is heated up 
slowly but steadily, the frog will not recognize the life-threatening 
condition and will be boiled alive. 
 By way of illustration the two kinds of mass movements can be 
compared to the waves of the ocean (Malik, 2010). The shorter and smaller 
waves, which break, have a white crest and attract our attention, correspond 
to second order mass phenomena. The longer, bigger and less violent waves, 
which continuously shape and define the character of the sea, correspond to 
first order mass phenomena. Similar to the long waves of the ocean these 
phenomena often serve as hotbed for second order mass movements, as 
already indicated in the example of the French revolution.  
 Importantly, not every second order phenomenon is driven by an 
underlying first order phenomenon. For example a fire in a soccer stadium 
may cause a panic among the crowd of visitors, although there is no 
underlying first order dynamics. While the first order phenomenon usually 
sets the stage for a second order phenomenon, the presence of an endogenous 
or exogenous trigger eventually provokes the visible outbreak. An example 
is National Socialism in Germany, which was initially propelled by 
disastrous sentiment and discontent in the German public. Germany had to 
overcome its defeat in World War I and people were confronted with bleak 
future economic prospects as well as poor living conditions. Additionally 
anti-Semitism, which emerged in the aftermaths of the “founders’ crash” at 
the end of the 19th century, took on greater significance (Hanloser, 2003).56 
The combination of the depressed public mood as the first order 
phenomenon with the appearance of a new political leader, who promised a 
better future and a superior German identity, triggered one of the most fatal 
political mass movements in history; a second order mass phenomenon that 
eventually resulted in World War II and the holocaust. 
4. First and second order mass dynamics in financial markets:  
 In this section we address the question, whether the concept of first 
and second order mass phenomena may be applied to advance the 
understanding of the recent financial and economic crisis and its underlying 
                                                          
56 The period after the “founders’ crash” or “Gruenderkrach” in 1873 is also known as the 
“Long Depression” and shows some astonishing parallels with the crisis of 2008, for 
example a boom resulting from  market liberalizations, over-expansion in credit markets as 
well as flawed collateralization and a financial market panic accompanied by bank runs and 
dried out capital markets. 
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processes. We therefore firstly discuss socio-economic developments in the 
past decades. In a second step we analyze if the concept of first and second 
order mass phenomena is applicable to financial markets and to which 
degree. 
4.1 Socio-economic developments 
 When looking at prevailing socio-economic trends in the past 
decades, first and foremost a significant increase in private consumption can 
be observed in western industrialized countries. Global consumption rose by 
28% in the 10-year-period from 1996 to 2006 and even tripled since 1960 in 
due consideration of population growth (Worldwatch Institute, 2010). The 
trend was eminently distinct in the United States, where domestic 
consumption not only became the major economic engine but also reduced 
the severity of recessions in the past decades (Cynamon and Fazzari, 2008; 
Keen, 2009). Importantly, one has to keep in mind that the increase in 
consumption evolved rather slowly, with an average annual increase of 2.5% 
during 1996 and 2006. 
 As Yamada (2008) points out, accumulation of capital is seriously 
hampered in an economic setting, where consumers have status preference 
and where the economy is characterized by consumerism and a bandwagon 
type social norm. His research points the direction to another socio-economic 
trend coming along with the increase in consumption, namely a significant 
shift in savings behavior, which brought about a private household debt 
binge. For example, the average U.S. personal savings rate had slowly turned 
into negative territory starting from +9% in the mid 1980s while the U.S. 
household mortgage debt gradually decupled during the past three decades57, 
as depicted in figure 3. Simultaneously the U.S. private household debt to 
Gross Domestic Product ratio had risen from around 50% in the mid 1980s 
to its peak of 98% in 2008. However, private household debt did not only 
surge in the United States but also in many other developed countries of the 
world, for example in the UK or Australia (Girouard, Kennedy and André, 
2006; Keen, 2009). This unrestrained accumulation of debt in private 
households, which led to the highest private debt to income ratios in decades, 
was favored by the constant relaxation of standards in bank lending, which 
will be discussed in section 4.3.  
                                                          
57 Meanwhile the number of households in the U.S. had only risen from around 80 million in 
1980 to about 111 million households in 2007. 
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Figure 3: U.S. household mortgage debt and U.S. personal savings rate 
(Data: Federal Reserve Board http://www.federalreserve.gov) 
To sum up, the most prominent socio-economic trend during the last 
decades involves a continuous process of change in consumer and savings 
behavior. Traditional savings behavior and conventional consumer behavior 
were gradually and slowly replaced by a subtle trend in society towards 
conspicuous consumption and living on tick, which strengthened steadily in 
many advanced industrial countries and throughout various social classes in 
the past century. For the benefit of signaling status and wealth to ones social 
environment by consuming more excellent goods, and conversely for 
avoiding the failure to consume in due quantity and quality, more and more 
people accepted progressively rising financial burden.  
4.2 A growing crowd of speculators 
 Another long-term development is reflected by the dynamics of a 
growing crowd of speculators flooding financial markets. The middle class 
has already been heavily involved in financial market speculation since the 
nineteenth century (Kindleberger, 1978/2005) and originally benefitted from 
the postwar booms in the past century. However, caused by the progressive 
globalization of financial markets as well as the achievements of modern 
trading and information technologies and due to structural socio-economic 
changes in society evermore people crowded the markets with the intention 
of increasing their capital and wealth. In particular due to a structural upward 
social mobility the upper social classes enlarged within advanced industrial 
societies, while the lower classes diminished (Deutschmann, 2008). As a 
consequence the volume of financial assets looking for profitable 
investments rose as the social reservoir of solvent debtors – hard working 
people longing for social advancement – and promising investment 
opportunities declined. Deutschmann (2008) concludes that this trend 
negatively affected the middle class and impelled capital market instability in 
the past decades.  
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 Moreover, the vast majority of people lose when they trade and 
speculate in stock markets. While the market boom is under way, they feel 
unconfident about the trend and behave risk-aversive, that is they refrain 
from buying stock, constantly trade in and out or buy too late and too high. 
By contrast they often panic too late in a crash and then behave loss-aversive 
and hold losing assets too long, hoping that the prices will rebound anytime 
soon, eventually leaving the markets with huge losses. The psychological 
principle, which primarily accounts for this kind of trading behavior, states 
that “losses loom larger than gains” and derives its origin form Prospect 
Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Shefrin and Statman (1985) place 
the behavioral pattern of selling winners too early and riding losers too long 
into a wider theoretical framework, which includes mental accounting, regret 
aversion, self-control and others.  
 In contrast to the more experienced investors, who made huge profits 
during the boom-bust cycles of the past decades by entering and leaving 
markets at the right time, a large population of “amateurs” lost a fortune or 
even went bankrupt from investing and trading in stocks and funds. To make 
up for their losses, some of them even took out loans and mortgages to 
finance future financial market speculations, which often resulted in even 
higher losses and increasing financial burden. Similarly, Keen (2009) 
suggests that borrowing to finance speculation on asset prices, rather than 
productive investment, was the overwhelming purpose of the growth in 
household debt since 1990, not only in the United States but also for example 
in Australia or the United Kingdom. Eventually, this pattern, which could be 
observed during the boom-bust cycles in financial markets of the last 25 
years, did not only result in a massive redistribution and extinction of 
personal wealth, but also contributed to the accumulation of debt in private 
households. 
4.3 Availability of credit and the illusion of economic long-term stability 
 So far only the borrowers’ and speculators’ side has been highlighted 
in our discussion. But the trends towards undersaving and conspicuous 
consumption, which led to unrestrained accumulation of debt in businesses 
and private households, would have been impossible without generous 
practices on the side of the credit giving actors and institutions. In particular 
the financial system tended to provide as much credit as businesses and 
private households were willing to accept (Keen, 2009). Generous credit-
creation practices of lenders were encouraged by the policies applied by 
national banks and governments during the periodic financial crises of the 
past decades. The research of Keen (2009) suggests that by rescuing Wall 
Street from its excesses in 1987 and thus forestalling a mild depression back 
then, the Federal Reserve set up the scene for a far more serious problem. 
Crisis management during the Asian crisis, the collapse of the dot.com 
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bubble and in the most recent crisis rather intensified this problem than 
contributing to its solution. In particular, crisis management by central banks 
and governments during the periodic financial crises of the past decades 
primarily focused on regaining growth in markets as quickly as possible and 
on preventing a breakdown in the financial system.  
 Conversely, discontinuing the gold-standard for the U.S. Dollar in 
August 1971, continuous removal of barriers and restrictions in financial 
markets, gradual lowering of collateral standards during the past decades 
(Heinsohn, Decker and Heinsohn, 2008) and very low official discount and 
prime rates by the largest central banks of the world as well as economic 
stimulus packages impelled a subtle long-term development, which may be 
characterized by the following aspects: Firstly, risk-awareness among market 
participants was reduced and a shift in human thinking was promoted, as 
people became convinced that the economy and financial markets had 
entered an extended period of stability. Secondly, markets were supplied 
with cheap capital for new speculations while the moral hazard phenomenon 
in financial institutions was encouraged, as market players’ expectations, that 
is to say they expected to be bailed out in case of a crisis, repeatedly got 
confirmed. And thirdly, the applied policies and measures led to a long-term 
trend of expansion of credit and thus favored the accumulation of debt. 
Increased availability of credit and social dynamics in consumer behavior 
seduced more and more people to buy, consume and live on tick.  
4.4 Socio-economic trends as a first order phenomenon 
 In a next step our work attempts to establish the bridge between the 
properties of first order mass phenomena and the interrelated socio-economic 
trends and developments discussed above. Referring to the underlying 
mechanisms of first order phenomena, we argue that people’s concern about 
their social status coupled with the propensity for emulation in human 
behavior entail some kind of “social competition”. This competition elicited 
and intensified this subtle trend towards conspicuous consumption and living 
on tick over the past decades. Research on the Economic Psychology of debt 
supports this suggestion. For example, Livingston and Lunt (1992) and 
Kirchler, Hoelzl and Kamleitner (2008) argue that consumption, savings, and 
indebtedness patterns of individuals and private households cannot fully be 
explained solely based on economic criteria, e.g. disposable income. 
Psychological and social aspects have to be taken into account as well. More 
specifically there is evidence that the tolerance and prevalence of debt and 
credit use in ones social environment considerably influence a person’s debt 
status (Lea, Webley and Walker, 1995). Debtors, for example, describe 
themselves as being in a social environment where debt is more common and 
more tolerated. Likewise households often imitate the consumer behavior 
they observe in their social reference – neighbors, co-workers, friends, 
European Scientific Journal   September 2013  edition vol.9, No.25  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
418 
relatives, etc. – and in reference models provided by mass media (Cynamon 
and Fazzari, 2008).  
 As in the shift in consumer and savings behavior, the underlying 
mechanisms of first order phenomena can also be found in the slowly 
emerging mass speculation: Blinded by the prospects of high profits as well 
as triumph and prosperity of others in their environment, more and more 
other-directed people entered the stock markets emulated other participants’ 
behavior. They simply followed others, although the inherent risks were 
widely unknown and unfamiliar to them. Importantly, people often take such 
non-rational financial risks not only due to overconfidence and an unrealistic 
appraisal of consequences of their behavior (Friedman and Savage, 1948), 
but also due to a lack of awareness, which is an important property of the 
dynamics of first order mass phenomena.  
 Additionally the discussed socio-economic trends and developments 
also reflect other properties of first order mass phenomena: their time 
horizon was rather long, changes in human thinking and behavior happened 
slowly and subtle58 and a pre-defined goal or direction cannot be recognized. 
What it all amounts to is that conventional consumer, savings and investment 
behavior were gradually replaced by subtle trends in society towards 
conspicuous consumption, living on tick and mass speculation. Most traders, 
consumers and policy makers did not consciously recognize these changes, 
since they took place rather slowly. The combination of these societal trends 
and behavioral patterns on the micro-level with increased availability of 
credit, particularly to low and middle income households, and weak crisis 
management, which provoked the illusionary idea of economic long-term 
stability, led to the accumulation of debt in governments, businesses and 
private households. Therefore we postulate the presence of a first order mass 
phenomenon, which may be identified as the emergence of a “self-sustaining 
culture of indebtedness” on the macro-scale that eventually resulted in the 
formation and expansion of a “debt bubble”.  
 Recalling the theoretical framework presented in this paper, long-
term processes of change in human behavior and thinking may be linked to 
apparent mass phenomena that only last for a short period of time. Given the 
existence of a first order phenomenon, which may be related to the area of 
finance, we now may proceed with our work and identify corresponding 
second order phenomena in financial markets.  
4.5 Second order phenomena in financial markets 
 Before identifying second order phenomena in financial markets, let’s 
take a brief look at the common view of the financial market crisis of 2008-
                                                          
58 This is best illustrated by the average annual increase in global consumption being only 
2.5% during 1996 and 2006. 
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2009. This view is closely related to the exuberant rise and fall in market 
prices in the U.S. housing bubble and its effects. Based on the expectation of 
continuously and rapidly rising housing prices in the United States, risk-
taking by financial institutions was increasingly stretched out and a tumor-
like boom in badly collateralized credits took place. The possibility of 
reselling the risks of these credits to other investors and traders using 
collateralized debt obligations (CDO) accelerated the growth in Subprime 
credits and earned financial institutions large profits. As a result badly 
collateralized securities were distributed nearly across the entire global 
financial system.  
 The collapse of the U.S. housing bubble at the beginning of summer 
2007, when the annual growth rate of returns in the U.S. residential housing 
market, which is measured by the S&P Case-Shiller U.S. National Home 
Price Index, fell into negative territory for the first time after fifteen years of 
continuous positive annual growth (see figure 4), sparked off a downward 
spiral and led to panic reactions of trading participants. Partly through direct 
financial linkage and partly through psychology the crisis nearly seized the 
entire world. In a circular process a credit market crunch, negative reports, 
loss of confidence as well as financial market turmoil and slumping national 
economies were fueled by each other. 
 
Figure 4: S&P Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index 
(Data: Standard & Poor’s http://www.standardandpoors.com/home/en/us)  
 Keeping in mind the properties and underlying mechanisms of second 
order mass phenomena (see section 2), we find that the boom-bust cycle in 
the U.S. housing bubble involves visible mass dynamics, which we may 
consciously observe. The comovement phenomenon in financial markets 
(Barberis and Shleifer, 2005) refers to decreasing variance in behavior and 
illustrates the underlying dynamics of this kind of mass phenomena, in which 
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other-directedness of market participants and social contagion processes 
become apparent: prices continue to go up in a boom, because noise traders 
and speculators are chasing the trend. With the rising number of market 
participants asset prices raise as well, causing traders to become even more 
confident, bullish, euphoric and less picky. In such an environment their 
expectations strengthen that any stock will be profit-bearing and exuberant 
rise of market prices becomes likely. Likewise prices continue to fall in a 
crash because losses and bad news lead to panic reactions of trading 
participants and reinforce a downward spiral, where more and more traders 
leave the markets driven by an increasing desire to disown stocks and other 
assets.  
 Therefore we suggest that the boom-bust cycle in the U.S. housing 
bubble may be viewed as a second order phenomenon with obvious 
ramifications for many people. Amongst them were home-owners, who 
realized that their properties increased dramatically in value over the years, 
experts, who warned against the excesses in the housing market, and policy 
makers and governments, who even endorsed the housing hype and building 
boom. Likewise previous episodes of speculative bubbles and subsequent 
crashes– e.g. the oil crises of the 1970ies, the Mexico crisis in 1994, the 
banking and loan crisis of the 1980ies with the Black Monday on 19th 
October 1987, the Asian economic miracle followed by the Asian economic 
crisis in the 1990ies, the New Economy boom at the end of the past century 
with the collapse of the Dot.com bubble in March 2000 – may be identified 
as visible and recognized outbreak in form of second order phenomena in 
financial markets, as well. Their impact on stock market indices is depicted 
in figure 5, using the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index as an example.  
 
Figure 5: S&P 500 historical stock chart, 1960 – Present weekly 
(Source: http://stockcharts.com/charts/historical/djia1960.html, accessed 28th June 2010, 
Chart courtesy of StockCharts.com) 
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4.6 Connecting first and second order phenomena in financial markets 
 The presented theoretical framework argues that it is unrecognized 
first order mass phenomena, which often set the stage for the visible 
outbreaks in form of recognized second order phenomena that eventually are 
triggered by exogenous or endogenous factors. The Financial Instability 
Hypothesis (FIH) (Minsky, 1975; Minsky, 1982), may serve as a bridge to 
set the connection between first and second order mass phenomena in 
financial markets. It argues that speculative booms in asset markets, which 
eventually lead to market crashes, start with a displacement and are fed by 
the expansion of credit. The displacement is a shock to the financial system 
and can take the form of the liberalization of new or emerging markets, the 
outbreak or end of a war, the adoption or the spreading of an innovation or of 
a new technology, and others.  
 Hence the endogenous or exogenous trigger in the theoretical 
framework may be compared to the displacement in the FIH. In fact, the 
dot.com bubble was triggered by the revolution of business models by means 
of the Internet. And the boom-bust cycle in the U.S. housing market was to a 
large extent linked to the most important financial innovations of the past 
decades (Longstaff, 2010), that is, collateralized debt obligations (CDO). 
Given these facts, the identified first order phenomenon, namely the culture 
of indebtedness and its accompanying debt bubble, which set the stage for 
the development of recognized boom-bust cycles in financial markets, may 
be viewed as a broader framing of the expansion of credit. 
5. Discussion and open problems: 
 At this point we may return to the starting point of this paper and 
resume, how the mass psychological perspective contributes to the 
discussion on the origins of the recent global economic and financial crisis. 
Firstly the recent crisis is – at least in part – the result of long-term structural 
socio-economic changes in advanced industrial societies. And secondly our 
work suggests that the recent global financial and economic crisis marks the 
onset of the collapse of a debt bubble, which has been fueled over the last 
more than 25 years. Tremendous amounts of debt piled up by numerous 
countries in the aftermath of the recent crisis slowed down or temporarily 
stopped the escape of air out of the collapsing bubble. But they in turn may 
foster the onset of an even more severe future crisis by impelling the 
underlying culture of indebtedness, instead of remembering an essential 
guideline in market regulation stated by economist Lionel Robbins (1937) 
after the Great Depression: The prevention of the boom is the only effective 
method to avoid a depression. In due consideration of this guideline and of 
contemporary major problems facing humanity, like climate change and 
future scarcity of resources, policy makers will sooner or later have to accept 
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the challenge of strongly encouraging a shift from consumerism to 
sustainability in society. When doing so, they will not get around considering 
the psychological leverages outlined in this paper, which involve status 
seeking, conspicuous consumption and above all the prevalent sentiment in 
subtle first order and apparent second order mass phenomena. 
 Importantly, the framework presented in this paper is intended to 
serve as a starting point for future work in this area. Additional research is to 
be undertaken to back up the foundations of the concept of first and second 
order mass dynamics and, in further consequence, to establish the bridge 
between the theoretical framework and the phenomena in financial markets. 
A remaining difficulty in the concept of first and second order mass 
dynamics is to empirically test or determine the presence or absence of a first 
order phenomenon at an early stage. With respect to the recurrent episodes of 
speculative booms and crises in financial markets in the past decades we 
characterized a first order phenomenon at the descriptive level in the 
aftermaths of its emergence. However, further research is to be conducted to 
provide relevant empirical indicators for the alleged culture of indebtedness 
and for consumerism beyond general figures on disposable income, 
consumption, private savings and debt ratios, and others. When considering 
the findings of research in Economic Psychology, consumer sentiment as 
well as subjective norms on household financial and consumer behavior may 
be among the determinants. In addition attention should be devoted to the 
interplay between indebtedness behavior on the micro-scale and aggregate 
debt levels. However, when searching for empirical indicators, one has to 
keep the long temporal horizon of socio-economic trends and first order 
mass dynamics in mind. Hence an appropriate methodological design for the 
detection of first order mass phenomena will have to gather longitudinal data 
on patterns and trends in human economic behavior. 
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